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Abstract. Blockchain design involves many tradeoffs, and much debate
has focused on tradeoffs related to scaling parameters such as blocksize.
To address some of the confusion around this subject, we present a prob-
ability proof of the DCS Triangle [1][2]. We use the triangle to show
decentralized consensus systems, like blockchains, can have Decentraliza-
tion, Consensus, or Scale, but not all three properties simultaneously. We
then describe two methods for getting around the limitations suggested
by the triangle.
1 Definitions
A system is defined as any set of components (see Decentralization Scope) fol-
lowing precise rules in order to provide service(s) to the users of the system.
These services constitute the system’s intended behavior.
In other words, a system 𝑆 consists of a set of components, called its scope
{𝑆}, and a program (“state transition function”, 𝑓𝑆), that together define the
system’s intended behavior, which means: upon receipt of message 𝑚, 𝑆 uses 𝑓𝑆
to update the internal state from 𝑠 to 𝑠′ and send back reply 𝑦 within a time
interval 𝑆𝜏 .
𝑆(𝑡) = { {𝑆} = {𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡1, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡2, ⋯}𝑓𝑆(𝑚, 𝑠) = {𝑠′, 𝑦}
We note, additionally:
• The scope {𝑆} may change over time, but there are always several compo-
nents of a vital type (i.e. “all systems always have at least one CPU, one
developer, and one user”).
• The system’s state 𝑠 includes all data necessary for the system to compute
𝑓𝑆 given a message 𝑚. The system may limit messages to those that are
1
authorized in some way (in order to prevent denial-of-service).1
• 𝑆 is considered compromised if it fails to perform its intended behavior
within the interval 𝑆𝜏 .
We will proceed to prove that any single such system may possess, at most, two
of three properties:
Consensus
Scale
Decentralized
• Consensus means the system uses a collective decision-making process
(“consensus algorithm”) to update the system’s state, 𝑠, which is shared
by all consensus participants. The result of the consensus algorithm de-
termines the network’s accepted output of 𝑓𝑆, and whether or not 𝑓𝑆
completes within 𝑆𝜏 .
• Scale means the system is capable of handling the transactional demands
of any competing system providing the same service to the same arbitrary
set of users across the globe (“at scale”).2
• Decentralized means the system has no single point of failure or control
(SPoF). Another way to state this is: if any single element is removed from
{𝑆}, the system continues to perform its intended behavior, and no single
component in {𝑆} has the power to redefine 𝑓𝑆 on its own.
1.1 Consensus participants and “full” consensus
The concept of a “consensus participant” is sometimes confused with the concept
of a “validator”, and in order to understand what the DCS Triangle is saying
it’s necessary to understand the difference between the two.
Every consensus process has three ingredients: voters (consensus participants),
voting rules, and the votes themselves.
In distributed systems, the job of a validator is to verify that the voting rules
were followed, accepting the outcome of the vote if that is so, and rejecting the
outcome otherwise. For example, in the physical world a validator might be
responsible for verifying ballot forms were filled out correctly and were cast by
1For decentralized systems, this is okay as long as there is no central authority determining
who is or isn’t authorized.
2Examples of “services” include: streaming video, sending messages, maintaining balances
on a ledger, etc.
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registered voters only, but beyond that they do not (generally speaking) have
the ability to influence the outcome of the vote.
Consensus participants, on the other hand, are the voters themselves, and their
job is to not only ensure that voting rules are followed, but to cast a vote on
some decision.
In Bitcoin, for example, “miners” are consensus participants whose job is to vote
on which transactions are accepted into the blockchain, whereas non-mining “full
nodes” are validators only, and their job is to ensure that miners do not produce
invalid blocks.
Definition. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 are independent entities who each main-
tain a complete copy of a system’s state, and together vote on updates to this
shared state.
The notion of a “complete copy of a system’s state” is of utmost importance
for our proof. In other words, our proof focuses specifically on the strongest
notion of “consensus”, where each consensus participant has full knowledge of
the entire system state, and therefore is able to cast a vote without needing to
trust any other participant.
To emphasize this notion of consensus over weaker forms, we’ll refer to it as full
consensus in our theorem.
In §3 - Getting around the DCS Triangle, we’ll explore how, by loosening this
requirement and treating “consensus” as a spectrum of trust assumptions, it
may be possible to design decentralized consensus systems that scale with “good-
enough-consensus”.
1.2 Decentralization scope & relativity
Implicit to our definition of a decentralized system is the idea that the system
is not compromised. A non-functioning system does not fulfill its intended
behavior, and therefore, by our definition, is not decentralized.
Imagine a decentralized system 𝑆, whose intended behavior (its purpose) is to
maintain the integrity of a database while being responsive to queries. It does
so by attempting to eliminate all single points of failure within a given scope.
Definition. The 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 of a system refers to all subcomponents and all entities
reasonably relevant to a system’s functioning.
If we consider the scope of our “decentralized” database to be a computer with
two CPUs and two hard disks (one primary, another backup), then we can say
𝑆 is “decentralized” at 𝑡 = 0 (has no single point of failure). However, if at
𝑡 = 1 one of the hard disk fails, it is no longer decentralized since now there
does exist a single component capable of compromising the entire system.
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This means:
• Whether or not a system is decentralized can change over time.
• Any system can be called “decentralized” if we define the scope narrowly
enough.
• All decentralized systems can be called “centralized” if we define their
scope broadly enough.3
The narrowing and enlarging of the scope is called the relativity of decentraliza-
tion, and it is why first agreeing on a reasonable definition for a system’s scope
is vital before deciding whether or not it is “decentralized”.
1.3 Computational throughput of consensus systems
Definition. The 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 of a consensus system refers to the
rate at which the system updates its state by processing all input messages.
We’ll use the shorthand 𝑇 (𝑆) to represent this concept and note three factors
that determine its value:
1. The computational power4 of each consensus participant.
2. The amount of time after which the consensus algorithm considers mes-
sages to be lost (the timeout period).
3. The consensus threshold that decides when consensus has been reached
(i.e. “how big of a quorum is required”).
Note that if the computational power of a consensus participant is significantly
less than that of the other participants, they are more likely to be excluded from
the deciding quorum for several reasons:
• If there are no network partitions to determine otherwise, fast consensus
participants will process messages more quickly and therefore will be first
to create a quorum.
• If there are enough fast consensus participants to create a large enough
quorum to exceed the system’s consensus threshold, then there is no need
to wait for the remaining votes of the slow participants.
• Slow consensus participants are more likely than fast consensus partici-
pants to hit the system’s timeout period for processing and responding
to messages, and therefore are more at risk of being excluded from the
consensus process entirely.
Therefore, 𝑇 (𝑆) is a function that is limited by the slowest consensus partici-
pants not excluded in the deciding quorum.
3The entire Internet could be considered centralized if we include the entire solar system
as part of the scope. The “single point of failure” could be the Earth itself, its atmosphere,
the Sun, etc. Or, perhaps in the not distant future, a single ISP.
4This refers to all computational requirements relevant for consensus participation, such as
bandwidth, data storage, and processing speed.
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1.4 Coordination costs
Relevant for our proof is the notion of coordination costs, or the difficulty for
one entity to engage another and work toward a common goal, because that can
result in the formation of a cartel, which in turn violates the requirement that
consensus participants be independent.
For example, when Bitcoin was first launched, it would be difficult for any
miner to find enough collaborating miners to create a cartel with >50% of
the hash power, simply because there were many “relevant miners” (consensus
participants) distributed all over the world.
Today, however, there are significantly fewer consensus participants in Bitcoin,
and it is much easier to (1) identify them, and (2) bring them together to
coordinate around some goal. Therefore, we say the coordination costs are
lower today than before.
We can approximate the coordination costs 𝐶(𝑆) of any consensus system simply
as the number of consensus participants:
𝐶(𝑆) = num_consensus_participants({𝑆})
Population of potential users
Users of 𝑆1
Consensus participants
Fig. 1: If 𝑆1 is a decentralized consensus system, the DCS Theorem states that as the number
of users increases (red circle), the number of consensus participants decreases (green circle).
2 Proof
Theorem 1. Decentralized consensus systems centralize at scale when consen-
sus participants maintain full consensus over the entire state of the system.
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We begin with the following axioms accepted as true:
Axiom 1. In any sufficiently large population (at scale), individual access to
computational power is distributed unequally. Most have access to average com-
putational power, and a few have access to large amounts.
Justification: empirically true.
Axiom 2. For any two systems offering the same service to the same large
population, the transactional demands of the average user converge at scale.
Justification: follows from central limit theorem and the law of large numbers.
Axiom 3. Most users of a system do not have the computational power required
to store and process all of the messages generated by all of the users of that system
at scale.
Justification: empirically true.5
From those axioms, we derive the following lemmas:
Lemma 1. Let 𝑆 be a decentralized consensus system whose consensus partic-
ipants maintain full consensus over the system’s state. Let 𝑇 (𝑆) refer to its
computational throughput and 𝑐 refer to the average computational power of all
historical consensus participants at any relevant instant in time. At scale, 𝑇 (𝑆)
exceeds 𝑐, and the more users 𝑆 obtains, the more 𝑇 (𝑆) exceeds 𝑐.
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Fig. 2: Visualization of (Axiom 1).
Proof. This follows directly from Axiom 1, 3, and our definition of a decentral-
ized system, which includes the understanding that for a system to be considered
5And perhaps provably true, though such a proof is beyond the scope of this paper.
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decentralized, it must be uncompromised, and that in turn means it successfully
processes all authorized6 messages from new users within some interval 𝑆𝑡. For
it to do this, 𝑇 (𝑆) must exceed 𝑐, per (Axiom 1) and (Axiom 3).
Lemma 2. Let 𝑆 be a consensus system as in (Lemma 1). The coordination
costs for 𝑆, 𝐶(𝑆), decrease at scale.
Proof. This follows directly from our proof for (Lemma 1) and our definition
of 𝐶(𝑆). The more 𝑆 scales, the more 𝑇 (𝑠) exceeds 𝑐, and the fewer potential
consensus participants are able to participate in consensus. This, in turn, makes
it easier for the remaining consensus participants to identify and coordinate with
each other.
Lemma 3. Let 𝑆 be a consensus system as in (Lemma 1). The probability that
{𝑆} contains a colluding group capable of censoring transactions increases at
scale, and therefore 𝑆 tends toward centralization at scale.
Proof of the Main Theorem. The final lemma restates our original theorem. As
coordination costs decrease (Lemma 2), the probability of a colluding group
(a cartel) increases. The presence of a cartel capable of controlling consensus
represents a single point of failure capable of preventing the system from fulfilling
its intended purpose. The definition of a centralized system is one that has
a single point of failure. Therefore, we’ve shown that the probability of the
initially decentralized system becoming centralized increases at scale.
It is also worth considering our definition of scale and the implications of (Ax-
iom 2). Per (Axiom 2), when a decentralized consensus system 𝑆1 scales to the
size of a similar centralized consensus system 𝑆2, it will experience the same
transactional demands as 𝑆2. However, 𝑆2 may scale to a size that would guar-
antee cartel formation in 𝑆1 if it were to scale to the same size. Therefore,
𝑆1 cannot scale to such a size while remaining decentralized, and therefore 𝑆1
cannot satisfy our definition of scale.
3 Getting around the DCS Triangle
As mentioned, the DCS triangle applies to systems employing “full consensus”,
or in other words, when all consensus participants are required to fully and
independently verify the entire state of the system.
It may be possible to “get around” the DCS Triangle by relaxing our definition
of consensus. In this section we’ll consider two such approaches.
6See footnote 1 on page 1.
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3.1 Combining DC and DS systems
Let us suppose we have a DC-system that we wish to scale while preserving its
decentralization. An example of such a system is Bitcoin.[3]
Per the triangle, we know that increasing the system’s throughput, 𝑇 (𝑆), via
any mechanism that requires all consensus participants to process the additional
data, will result in a reduction in the number of independent consensus partici-
pants. And so, instead, we may choose to pair our DC-system with a DS-system
in some clever way.
D
S
C
+
C
S
D
Our DS-system will give us the scale we’re looking for, while our DC-system
provides a stable and secure source of “ultimate truth” on an as-needed basis.
We can connect the two systems in such a way that our DS-system only requires
consensus in rare moments, and when it does it may communicate with our DC-
system.
The Lightning Network[4] is a real-world example of such a pairing.
3.2 Combining multiple DC systems
Yet another possibility is to combine multiple DC systems to create a super-
system of DC groups.
This approach explores a middle-ground within the DCS triangle, and is the
approach taken by systems like OmniLedger.[5]
Consensus
Scale
Decentralized
Also known as sharding, each group (or shard) of consensus participants no
longer has complete knowledge of the entire system state, and therefore must
(at least partially) trust the other consensus groups. Transparency techniques,
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such as merkle tree logs, make it possible to minimize the amount of “faith”
groups must place in each other.
Overall system consensus is progressively “sacrificed” as the system scales, but
only in small, manageable increments. If the system does not need much inter-
group consensus, it can scale significantly without issue. If necessary, a DS-
system can be added for additional scale.
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